Introducing Social Norms in Game Theory by López-Pérez, Raúl
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper Series 
ISSN 1424-0459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 292 
Introducing Social Norms in Game Theory  
Raúl López-Pérez  
June 2006  
 
 
 
  
 
Introducing Social Norms in Game Theory*
 
Raúl López-Pérez†
 
June 2006 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explicitly introduces norms in games, assuming that they shape 
(some) players’ utility and beliefs. People feel badly when they deviate from a 
binding norm, and the less other players deviate, the more badly they feel. 
Further, people anger at transgressors and get pleasure from punishing them. I 
then study how social norms and emotions affect cooperation, coordination, and 
punishment in a variety of games. The model is consistent with abundant 
experimental evidence that alternative models of social preferences cannot 
explain.  
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1. Introduction 
A norm is a rule that prescribes behavior –that is, any statement of the form ‘in 
situation x, you ought to do y’. For instance, all laws, codes of honor, moral principles, or 
religious commandments are norms according to this wide-ranging definition.   
Prominent social researchers like Emile Durkheim or Talcott Parsons have pointed 
out the vital role that norms play in the attainment of social order –see also Arrow (1974), 
and Elster (1989). According to this view, most social norms commend pro-social behavior 
and hence are crucial to promote cooperation and social cohesion, which are basic 
ingredients for a society to exist.  
Of course, this begs the question of why (and when) people respect norms. This 
paper offers a simple game-theoretical model to address such a question. The model 
applies on any game of perfect recall and keeps the standard assumptions that all players 
are rational and able to form accurate expectations about other players’ behavior. 
However, it relaxes the standard selfishness hypothesis that all players are exclusively 
motivated by their own material interest –that is, their own consumption and leisure. 
Instead, the model assumes that people also care about norms, which means two 
things. First, and in line with Classical Sociology (Parsons, 1967) and Social Psychology, 
norms shape preferences. When someone internalizes a norm (Elster, 1989; Becker, 1996; 
Gintis, 2003), she becomes emotionally attached to it so that painful emotions get 
triggered when she transgresses the norm (shame, guilt), or when others deviate (anger, 
indignation).1 Second, norms also shape beliefs by acting as focal points in games 
(Schelling, 1960; Sugden, 1989). More precisely, players find obvious or prominent an 
equilibrium in which players respect internalized norms -if such equilibrium exists-, and 
that coordinates beliefs about co-players’ behavior. 
 So, when do people obey norms? As agents care about both norms and material 
interest, the interesting case appears when respect for an internalized norm is at odds with 
one’s material interest. The model then predicts compliance either if the expected remorse 
(internal punishment) is intense enough or if the probability of being heavily sanctioned by 
others (external punishment) is high enough. Further, and because I also assume that a 
deviator’s bad feelings intensify if most others comply, people respect internalized norms 
in a reciprocal manner, that is, they are more willing to comply if others comply as well. 
Apart of exploring why people respect norms, this paper also studies a key 
empirical question, that is, what actual social norms are like.2 I focus on norms of 
distributive justice and show that if (some) agents have internalized a norm exhibiting a 
                                                 
1 Further, pleasant emotions like pride or admiration can be activated if one or others, respectively, 
respect an internalized norm. 
2 Roughly, a norm is social if a ‘large’ proportion of the population has internalized it. 
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concern for both efficiency and maximin (the EM-norm)3 the model then explains a large 
and varied array of well-replicated experimental results. This rough test suggests that such 
norm (or a similar one) is social –I have studied alternative norms in López-Pérez (2004). 
This will be of great interest for experimental economists, who have gathered in the 
last 30 years an impressive amount of evidence contradicting the standard selfishness 
hypothesis. The model explains, for instance, why people cooperate conditionally, why 
moving first in a sequential social dilemma makes people relatively more cooperative than 
in a simultaneous one, why punishment and cooperation depend on the menu of choices, 
why passive players are not punished, why (and when) social norms increase coordination, 
or why competitive markets induce principled people to behave as self-interested ones do. 
The model is related to recent theories of social preferences and reciprocity, which 
also relax the neoclassical hypothesis that all agents are selfish.4 Rabin (1993) models 
reciprocity in normal-form games as the idea that people are kind to those who are kind to 
them, and unkind to those who are unkind. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) extend 
Rabin’s ideas to extensive form games. Levine (1998) assumes type-based altruism and 
spitefulness, and both Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) propose 
models of inequity-averse players. Finally, Charness and Rabin (2002) and Falk and 
Fischbacher (2006) introduce both reciprocity and distributional concerns. 
Although none of these models explicitly introduces norms,5 they somehow admit 
an interpretation based on norms and hence provide some sensible intuitions on norm 
compliance. In spite of this, the model here has a number of advantages with respect to 
the other models. 
First, it explains better the experimental evidence in the large range of games that I 
analyze here and in López-Pérez (2004). One crucial reason for this is that it assumes that 
agents care about history. More precisely, people’s utility depends on whether others (or 
themselves) misbehaved –i.e., deviated from a binding norm- in the past. Hence, the 
model takes into account procedural justice. This is a key difference with outcome-based 
utility models like the inequity aversion ones. 
Second, the model is relatively simple and precise. Contrary to most models of 
reciprocity, the model here is not based on the Psychological Game Theory of Geanakoplos 
et al. (1989), so that agents’ utility does not depend on their beliefs. That makes the 
model much more parsimonious. Further, and contrary to Levine (1998), agents’ utility 
does not depend on the co-players’ types, and that prevents the existence of a multiplicity 
                                                 
3 In this paper, efficiency refers to the sum of players’ material payoffs, and not to Pareto efficiency. 
Maximin or need refers to the worst-off player’s income. 
4 Fehr and Schmidt (2002), Camerer (2003), and López-Pérez (2004) survey this literature. 
5 Arguably, the only exception is the reciprocity model of Charness and Rabin (2002). This model is 
extremely complicated, though. Somehow, one might view my model as a tractable version of the 
ideas present in Charness and Rabin (2002). 
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of equilibria. In fact, my model predicts a unique equilibrium in most games, which is 
crucial to facilitate experimental testing.  
Last, but not least, the model has a broader field of application because it explicitly 
introduces norms. One might use it to explain why people tell the truth and punish 
cheaters contrary to their material interest, or why people follow rules of etiquette, or 
norms regulating sexual relations. Other models have troubles in explaining such behavior 
because they posit that utility only depends on money allocations and/or on beliefs about 
allocations -and it is unclear how, say, sexual intercourse may affect those things! 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the model 
and the efficient-cum-maximin (EM) norm, respectively. Section 4 studies how the EM-
norm affects cooperation, coordination and punishment in different games, and shows the 
model to be consistent with abundant experimental evidence. The predictions of the model 
are briefly compared with those from other models in section 5. Section 6 concludes by 
mentioning possible extensions. 
2. A Model with Social Norms 
Consider a n-player, extensive form game of perfect recall Γ . Let N = {1,…,n} 
denote the set of players z  denote a terminal no )(zui  denote player i ’s utility 
payoff at z d )(zxi  denote player i ’s monetary payoff at z .
, de,
 an
a
la i rs. 
  
, 6 The lab game associated 
to game Γ  is obtained by substituting each monetary payoff )(zxi  for its corresponding 
utility p f )(zui  -distinguishing between lab games and proper games makes sense 
because, as I will po ter, u  and )(zxi  may differ for some
yof
sit )(z  playe
2.1 Norms 
Norms are exogenous rules that select actions in lab games and indicate how 
human players ought to behave –e.g., ‘Thou shalt not lie’. Let h  denote an information set 
and  denote the set of available actions at h . )(hA
Definition 1: A norm is a nonempty correspondence )(: hAh→Ψ  applying on any 
information set of any lab game, except on Nature’s ones. 
It is important to emphasize some ideas present in this definition. First, norms 
apply in lab games. Hence, no information about other player’s utility payoffs is required to 
apply a norm, something important to avoid circularity problems. I will be more precise on 
this point later. Second, norms apply on any information set of any lab game. This may 
appear very demanding at first sight because many actual rules of proper behavior have a 
restricted field of application. For instance, the norm to wear black in funerals does not say 
anything about behavior at the workplace so one might be tempted to think that it is not a 
norm according to the previous definition. However, it is easy to accommodate such a 
                                                 
6 More generally,  might be interpreted as a cardinal measure of the satisfaction that player i  
gets from consumption and leisure in the history of . 
)(zxi
z
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norm by simply assuming that it commends any behavior at the information set 
‘workplace’ –of course, other norms may be more restrictive.7
Given that norms select actions, a player is said to respect or comply with norm Ψ  
at  if (i) her choice at h  is consistent with h Ψ  or if (ii) she does not move at . 
Otherwise, she deviates from the norm.
h
 Suppose then that play reaches terminal node . 
By considering all actions in the path of , one may obtain the set of players who 
respected in the history of , 
z
z
Ψ z ),( zR Ψ , and its cardinality, ),( zr Ψ . If it is clear to 
which norm I refer, I will instead write  and )(zR )(zr . 
2.2 Preferences 
There are two types of players. Selfish players are standard money-maximizers who 
do not care about norms. Hence, their utility function is  
)()( zxzu ii = . 
In contrast, the utility of a principled player at depends on the money earned 
 and the history of . In other words, principled agents care about what they get 
and how they get it. The intuition here is that different histories activate different 
emotions: If principled player A deviates from what an internalized norm commends then 
she feels ashamed or guilty, whereas if A complies but another player deviates then A feels 
angry at him.
z
)(zxi z
8 More precisely, the utility function of a principled player i  who has 
internalized norm Ψ  equals 
)()( zrzxi ⋅− γ                        if )(zRi∉ , )0 ( γ<  
    = { )(zui )}({max)(
)(
zxzx j
zRj
i ∉
⋅−α            if )(zRi∈ , ( 10 ≤< α ),               
and it is convened that 0)}({max
)(
=
∉
zx j
zRj
 if nobody deviates –i.e., .  NzR =)(
Parameter γ  may be interpreted as a player’s internalization index. Note that 
ceteris paribus the intensity of a deviator’s bad feelings is assumed not to depend on the 
specific deviation she makes. That is, all deviations are equally ‘bad’. Although this 
assumption is clearly unrealistic, it greatly simplifies the model and suffices to explain 
many experimental facts. I come back to this issue in the conclusion. 
The more the people who respect the norm, the more badly a deviator feels. For 
simplicity, I have modeled this by means of a linear function, but any strictly increasing 
one would give the same qualitative results in the games I analyze. However, it is 
                                                 
7 Throughout the paper, the following statements are synonymous: ‘The norm selects action  at 
information set ’, ‘the norm commends to choose a  at ’, and ‘according to the norm, (the 
relevant mover) should choose  at .’ 
a
h h
a h
8 Therefore, norms shape utility. This explains why norms are defined to apply on lab games and not 
on proper games:  Circularity problems would appear if norms depended on utility payoffs (an 
ingredient of games) and at the same time affected utility.  
 5
important for the results that no principled deviator feels shame at  if all the other 
players deviate as well. As a result, a principled player never complies with an internalized 
norm if (a) compliance is at odds with her material interest and if (b) she expects all other 
player to deviate. This reciprocity idea will extensively appear in the applications. 
z
Finally, parameter α  measures aggressiveness –more precisely, an angry player i  
is willing to spend α  monetary units in order to reduce the best-off deviator’s monetary 
payoff in one unit. Note that α  is independent of the specific deviation that triggers the 
anger, a hypothesis that is again made for simplicity –in the conclusion I discuss this issue. 
For analogous reasons, I also assume that anger and the associated tendency impulse to 
retaliate focus on the best-off deviator if there are multiple deviators.    
2.3 Equilibrium Concept 
Since I consider both simultaneous and sequential games, Subgame Perfect 
Equilibrium (SPE) is a natural solution concept to use. In addition, I introduce a refinement 
to model the idea that norms act as focal points. Let '',' ss  denote a player’s pair of mixed 
strategies of a game. 
Definition 2: Strategy '  s Ψ-dominates strategy  if  specifies with some 
positive probability a deviation from norm 
''s ''s
Ψ  at an information set h  where  does not, 
and the opposite is not true at any other information set. 
's
In other words, strategy 's  Ψ-dominates strategy ''s  if the corresponding player 
respects norm Ψ unequivocally more under strategy 's  than under strategy ''s . This 
domination concept need not provide a complete ordering of a player’s strategies –i.e., it is 
logically possible that a strategy neither dominates nor is dominated by another strategy.  
Assumption 1: A principled player who has internalized norm  will not play an 
equilibrium strategy that is -dominated by another equilibrium strategy.  
Ψ
Ψ
This assumption, which is common knowledge, might be justified on two grounds. 
First, it is arguably an intuitive way to model focal points –ultimately, though, this is 
largely an empirical matter. According to this idea, an equilibrium in which principled 
players follow binding norms is more obvious, and this coordinates players’ beliefs.  
Second, this refinement makes the model more precise and simplifies much the 
analysis. When searching for the equilibria of a game, one can first focus attention on 
those strategy profiles such that principled players respect internalized norms at any 
information set –note that they usually form a reduced set in many games. If any such 
profile is an equilibrium profile then it is trivially not norm-dominated by any other. 
Consequently, finding all those equilibria would finish the equilibrium analysis –if there is 
no such equilibrium, one should continue considering all profiles such that principled 
players respect the norm at all information sets except (maybe) one, and so on. 
3. What Norm? 
One may think of infinite correspondences satisfying definition 1. To obtain precise 
behavioral predictions in games and test the model, however, one must assume something 
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about the specific norms that principled players have internalized. Further, the number of 
norms should not be too high in order to keep the model tractable. Ideally, one norm 
should be able to explain a significant fraction of the experimental results.  
This seems a difficult task because we know from sociologists and anthropologists’ 
reports that human societies have myriads of norms, and it is not easy to discern which 
the key ones are. A prominent candidate, though, appear to be norms of distributive 
justice because concepts like fairness or justice are often employed to justify behavior. 
 These are prescriptions based on orderings of money distributions or, more 
generally, material welfare allocations. As an example, consider a norm that selects any 
action pointing towards an efficient and maximin outcome, conditional on others doing the 
same. More formally, let )(ΔX  denote the set of all monetary allocations of lab gameΔ . 
Definition 3: Allocation )(},...,{ 1 Δ∈= Xxxx n  is efficient-cum-maximin (EM) if it 
maximizes function 
}{min)( i
Ni Ni
i xxxF ∑
∈ ∈
+= δ                                                                      (1)  
over )(ΔX , where δ<0 . An EM-path of Δ  is a path leading to an EM-allocation of 
. An EM-action is an action that belongs to an EM-path.Δ  
Definition 4 (the EM-Norm): If  is on one EM-path, the EM-norm selects only 
the EM-actions in . Otherwise, the EM-norm selects the whole set . 
h
)(hA )(hA
In other words: As far as everybody respects the EM-norm, then one must strive to 
achieve an EM-allocation; but if it is known for certain that at least one player has deviated 
then any behavior is allowed –i.e., the norm is conditional in an extreme form. The reader 
can verify that this is truly a norm –i.e., a nonempty correspondence selecting at least one 
action at any information set of any lab game. Similar norms of distributive justice are 
easily obtained by conveniently changing function (1). Thus, a norm embodying egalitarian 
concerns might correspond to function 
}{max}{min)( iNiiNi
e xxxF
∈∈
−= .                                                          (2)   
The EM-norm is extremely simple, and one can think of more sophisticated norms –
for examples, consult López-Pérez (2005). In spite of that, I will assume in what follows 
that the EM-norm is the only norm that principled players care about. This simplifies much 
the analysis, and it is enough to replicate a good deal of the experimental facts. 
An important reason why the EM-norm succeeds in explaining the evidence is 
because it assumes that people view both efficiency and maximin as basic ingredients of 
distributive justice. This implies that principled people are willing to sacrifice some money 
in order to promote efficiency and the welfare of the worst-off player(s), but not to 
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promote payoff equality. This point is particularly well illustrated and supported by the 
evidence coming from individual decision lab problems with externalities.9  
I provide two examples. First, to show that people are willing to spend money for 
the sake of efficiency and maximin, consider a situation in which agent B has no say 
whereas player A must choose between (A, B) pecuniary allocations (4, 4) and (4-ε , 10). 
If ε  and δ  are small enough (more precisely, 6)1( <+⋅ δε ), the only EM-allocation is (4-
ε , 10) and hence the EM-norm commends to choose it. My model predicts that behavior if 
player A is a principled one who has internalized the EM-norm and her internalization 
parameter γ  is larger than ε  -incidentally, she would clearly opt for (4, 4) if she were 
selfish. In contrast, she would unequivocally choose (4, 4) if she had internalized an 
egalitarian norm like that of (2).     
Second, to show that people are not willing to spend money simply to promote 
equality, assume now that A must select either (3, 3) or (4, 6). According to my model A 
will always go for the latter allocation (whatever her type). In contrast, she would choose 
(3,3) if she had internalized an egalitarian norm and her γ  was large enough. 
In any case, more experiments are required to investigate what distributions people 
deem fair or just. For instance, it might be that nations or groups of people differ in what 
they view as fair. Thus, economists might be more concerned about efficiency than others 
- consult Fehr et al. (forthcoming) for evidence on this. Nevertheless, it must be pointed 
out that the model here is flexible enough to include such ideas. For instance, one could 
introduce some heterogeneity by assuming that some principled people have internalized 
the EM-norm while others have internalized an egalitarian norm. 
4. Explaining the Evidence from the Lab 
This section studies how the EM-norm affects cooperation, competition, 
coordination and punishment in several games. For simplicity, I assume that each player’s 
type is common knowledge although I give some intuitions for the incomplete information 
case. In what follows, let ρ  denote the fraction of principled players in the population. 
4.1 Cooperation 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Lab Game  
To analyze the effects of the EM-norm on cooperation, it is convenient to consider 
first a lab game that has received huge attention from experimentalists: The Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD) of Figure 1.  
The two players (John and Ana in the example) simultaneously decide whether they 
cooperate (action C) or defect (action D). Both earn monetary units if they cooperate, 
and if both defect. Further, a unilateral defector gets a ‘temptation’ payment of while 
c
d t
                                                 
9 Consult Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992), Charness and Rabin (2002), Konow (2003), and 
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) for evidence, and López-Pérez (2004) for a more extensive discussion 
of this point. 
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a unilateral cooperator gets a normalized payoff of zero. Payoffs satisfy -
i.e., defection strictly dominates cooperation in monetary terms- and  so that ( ) 
is the only EM-allocation and cooperation is the only EM-action. In short, there exists a 
stark conflict between self-interest and compliance with the norm.        
0>>> dct
tc >2 cc,
  John 
  C D 
C cc  ,  t,0  
Ana 
D 0,t  dd ,  
                      Figure 1: (Ana’s, John’s) Monetary Payoffs in the PD Lab Game 
To illustrate players’ utility payoffs, assume that Ana is selfish and John is principled 
(other cases can be analogously analyzed). Trivially, Ana’s utility coincides with her own 
pecuniary payoff. On the other hand, John gets some disutility (shame) if he deviates 
unilaterally from the EM-norm or if Ana does so (anger), but he feels no disutility if both 
players defect. Figure 2 represents all this. 
Behavioral predictions are straightforward. First, mutual defection is the only Nash 
equilibrium if at least one player is selfish or if ct −<γ  and both players are principled. 
Second, mutual cooperation is the unique refined equilibrium if both players are principled 
and ct −≥γ  - although mutual defection is also a Nash equilibrium, it can be ruled out 
because it is EM-dominated by mutual cooperation (assumption 1).   
  John 
  C D 
C cc ,  γ−t,0  
Ana 
D tt ⋅− α ,  dd ,  
                   Figure 2: Utility Payoffs if Ana is Selfish and John is Principled 
 To sum up, principled players are conditional cooperators: They only cooperate if 
the other player is expected to cooperate as well. Intuitively, this idea also extends to a 
setting where players’ types are private information. In that case, a principled player 
cooperates only if she believes with enough probability that her co-player is principled –
i.e., the type of people who cooperate. More precisely, one can easily show that principled 
players cooperate in the simultaneous PD if priors are above threshold10
simρ  = γα
α
++−⋅+
⋅+
cttd
td
.                                                          (3) 
Consistent with the model, numerous experiments with one-shot prisoner’s 
dilemmas –consult Rapoport and Chammah (1965), and Rabin (1993) for surveys; and 
Sally (1995) for a meta-analysis- find that a significant proportion of players cooperate, 
and that cooperation strongly depends on the expectation that the co-player will cooperate 
                                                 
10 Note that condition  requires simρ≥1 ct −≥γ . 
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as well. Thus, in one of the experimental treatments reported by Croson (2000), subjects 
played ten times a PD lab game against different co-players and they were asked to guess 
at the start of each round her co-player’s future choice. 83% of the participants that 
guessed their counterpart would cooperate cooperated themselves. On the contrary, when 
participants expected that their opponent would defect, only 32% of them cooperated.  
To finish, inspection of threshold (3) indicates that  depends negatively on 
and positively on and . The same occurs with the expected price of cooperation, 
that is, the net, expected material gain from defection. Taking as well into account that 
cooperation is hindered as  grows, a law of demand follows: Cooperation decreases 
when its price increases. This prediction is again consistent with experimental evidence –
see Rapoport and Chammah (1965, pp. 36-39), and Clark and Sefton (2001).  
simρ
c t d
simρ
Fostering Cooperation: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Mechanisms  
Assume now that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is played in a sequential manner –e.g., 
Ana chooses after observing John’s move. Apparently, this is a minor change. Indeed, the 
standard model predicts zero cooperation here, as in the simultaneous PD. If the second 
player is principled, though, the sequential mechanism changes players’ incentives to 
comply with the EM-norm, and fosters cooperation. 
To understand this point, note first that the sequential PD has a unique EM-path. In 
it, both players cooperate one after the other, hence reaching the EM-allocation. As a 
result, the EM-norm commends the first mover to cooperate. Further, it also commends 
the second mover to cooperate if the first mover cooperates, but allows any action if the 
first mover defects (definition 4). Consequently, the first mover is the only deviator from 
the EM-norm –i.e., the only person who ‘misbehaves’- if both players choose defection. 
This is a subtle but key difference with the simultaneous PD, in which both players count 
as deviators if they mutually defect. 
Given these norm prescriptions, the sequential PD has a unique Subgame Perfect 
Equilibrium for each parameter calibration –proving this is easy. I start by describing the 
second mover’s equilibrium strategy. On one hand, a selfish second mover always defects. 
On the other hand, a principled second mover reciprocates the first mover’s choice if she is 
principled and ct −≥γ  -that is, she cooperates if he cooperated and defects if he 
defected- whereas she always defects if ct −<γ . 
Experimental evidence from Hayashi et al. (1999) and Clark and Sefton (2001) is 
consistent with these predictions. Second movers often cooperate conditional on the first 
mover’s choice, while unconditional cooperation is negligible. In addition, Clark and Sefton 
(2001) show that reciprocation falls as its material cost rises, something that is also 
consistent with my model, as reciprocation only occurs if ct −≥γ . 
Finally, the first mover’s equilibrium strategy depends on his type and the second 
mover’s. A selfish first mover cooperates only if the second mover is principled and 
ct −≥γ  –this follows simply from . A principled first mover only cooperates if the dc >
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second mover is principled and } ,min{ ctdt −+⋅≥ αγ , and if the second mover is selfish 
and dt +⋅≥αγ . In this latter case, the first mover cooperates even when he knows that 
his opponent will later defect. In that way, he avoids being the person who ‘spoiled’ 
cooperation, something that he finds particularly painful if dt +⋅≥αγ .  
The above mentioned results can be easily extended to an incomplete information 
setting. Since principled second movers reciprocate (if ct −≥γ ) and selfish ones always 
defect, a principled first mover cooperates in the sequential PD if 
ctd ⋅+⋅−⋅−<− ραργ )()1( , that is, if his prior is above threshold 
seqρ  = 
ct
td
+⋅
−⋅+
γ
γα
.                                                                  (4) 
Comparison between equations (3) and (4) indicates that >  if simρ seqρ ct −≥γ . 
Further, we have seen that selfish players never cooperate in the simultaneous PD but 
cooperate in the sequential PD if they move first and their prior is large enough. As a 
result, first movers’ rate of cooperation in the sequential PD is significantly larger than the 
average cooperation rate in the simultaneous PD. This is consistent with the experimental 
evidence reported by Hayashi et al. (1999) and Clark and Sefton (2001).  
To sum up, moving first in a sequential dilemma makes people more cooperative 
than if they choose simultaneously. This occurs for two key reasons. First, deviating from 
the EM-norm (or from any conditional norm of cooperation) in the sequential PD is 
unilateral. As a result, deviating is psychologically more disturbing than in the 
simultaneous PD, where simultaneous deviations are also possible. Second, selfish first 
movers with large enough priors find profitable to comply with the EM-norm because they 
understand that they can ‘emotionally force’ a principled second mover to comply as well, 
and so get more money than if both defect.11  
On Positive Reciprocity  
In some models of reciprocity -Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006)- one may distinguish between 
positive reciprocity (being kind with those who are kind) and negative one (being unkind 
with those who are unkind). Positive reciprocity implies that people are more kind with an 
active and kind player than with a passive player who makes no choice in the game.  
To illustrate this, consider again the sequential PD lab game but assume now that 
the first mover –that is, John- has only action C available –i.e., he is a passive player. The 
only active player is Ana, who must choose therefore between (Ana’s, John’s) allocations 
( ) and ( ). Clearly, the above mentioned reciprocity models predict that Ana will 
choose ( ) significantly more if John is passive (call this the passive cooperation case) 
than if John is active and chose ‘kind’ action C (active cooperation case). 
cc  , 0 ,t
0 ,t
                                                 
11 See Rabin (1993, p. 1296) on this regard. 
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However, the available experimental evidence does not seem to support this 
prediction. Thus, Camerer (2003, pp.89-90) survey some results in this regard and 
concludes that the effect of positive reciprocity is insignificant or small. 
What does my model predict in the passive and active cooperation settings? 
Contrary to other reciprocity models, it predicts invariance, or no positive reciprocity. In 
effect, Ana makes the same move in both cases whatever her type: She defects and 
attains allocation ( ) if she is selfish, and cooperates (the EM-action) if she is principled 
and 
0 ,t
ct −≥γ . Hence, the model is more consistent with the experimental evidence. 
The intuition behind the invariance result is twofold. On one hand, selfish types only 
care about available outcomes, and not about previous history, so that invariance makes 
no surprise. On the other hand, and in case nobody has broken the norm, it makes no 
difference for a principled player whether compliance happened because everybody was 
active and compliant or because everybody was passive –passive players, recall, respect 
the norm by definition. As a result, principled players treat equally well both passive 
players and active compliant players.12
What explains Invariance?   
The previous comparison has pointed out one key difference between my model 
and other models of reciprocity. However, models like Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2000), and the quasi-maximin model of Charness and Rabin (2002) also 
predict invariance. This occurs because these models assume that players only care about 
the distribution of income –i.e., players have consequentialistic utility functions. Hence, 
one can wonder whether the invariance result is the effect of subjects having 
consequentialistic preferences. 
Although I will investigate this issue in more detail and give some evidence when 
studying punishment, it may be worth to consider again the sequential PD. Now, however, 
I will consider Ana’s behavior in the following two situations: (i) John is active and has 
chosen action D (active defection case), and (ii) John is passive and has only action D 
available (passive defection case). 
Since Ana faces (Ana’s, John’s) allocations ( ) and  in both cases, a 
consequentialistic model predicts invariance –i.e., Ana always chooses the same allocation. 
My model, on the contrary, predicts some variance if Ana is principled. On one hand, she 
chooses ( ) in the active defection case because then she feels angry at John. On the 
other hand, Ana does not feel any anger at a passive John and moreover the EM-allocation 
is  if 
dd  , ),0( t
dd  ,
),0( t td <⋅+ )2( δ . Consequently, she chooses  if ),0( t t and γ are large enough. 
                                                 
12 Incidentally, it is often argued that rewards –i.e., acts that generate positive externalities on 
someone who has previously behaved in an approved way- are evidence in favor of positive 
reciprocity. The discussion here suggests that this assertion must be treated with care: Rewards 
might be alternatively explained as a result of people following social norms of distributive justice. 
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To sum up, while a principled player may sacrifice some money to treat kindly a 
passive player, she will never do that with a deviator. This idea is absent in a 
consequentialistic model, but it is important to appreciate why institutions have incentives 
to signal that they had no other choice when they made a tough decision that affected 
others. In that way, other agents will not perceive that choice as a violation of prevailing 
norms and hence will not get angry. For instance, many European governments and 
politicians who advocate for reforms in their Welfare States often argue that Globalization 
leaves them no way out. Though some of them may sincerely believe that, such type of 
arguments might be also part of a strategy designed to prevent voters’ indignation.      
Lab Games with n Players: Public Goods  
In a simple Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) public good lab game,  
subjects, each one with an endowment of  monetary units, choose simultaneously 
whether to contribute e  to a public good or to keep the endowment for them.
2≥n
e
13 Subject 
's monetary payoff at terminal node i z  is given by )(zcem ⋅⋅  if she contributes and by 
 if she does not contribute, where m  denotes the monetary payoff per unit 
of public good and is such that 
)(zceme ⋅⋅+
mnm ⋅<< 1 , and  stands for the number of players 
that contribute to the public good in the history of . Since 
)(zc
z 1<m , the dominant strategy 
in material terms is not to contribute. Nevertheless, many experiments report aggregate 
contribution levels around 40-60% -for a survey, consult Ledyard (1995).  
To get behavioral predictions, note first that the EM-norm commends every player 
to contribute because . Let then  (mn ⋅<1 pn nnp ≤≤0 ) denote the number of principled 
players in the group (recall that I assume that players’ types are common knowledge). For 
any  and pn αγ  , , the VCM lab game has a unique refined equilibrium: 
• If em ⋅⋅< αγ , no player contributes. 
• If em ⋅⋅≥ αγ , no selfish player contributes while a principled player 
contributes only if nnp =  or if nnp <  and 
),,(*)1()1()()1( γααγ
γαγα mn
em
mennemenmenme ppppp =⋅⋅−
++−⋅≥⇔−⋅−⋅+≥⋅+⋅⋅−⋅⋅ .   (5) 
The intuition is clear: Principled players respect the EM-norm if sufficiently many 
others do it as well. Note that there exist other equilibria if , but they are EM-
dominated because at least one principled player does not contribute in them and hence 
deviates from the EM-norm.  
*pp nn ≥
Observe also that , the minimal number of principled agents necessary to 
sustain positive contributions (the critical mass), does not depend on the total number of 
*pn
                                                 
13 In more complex VCM games, players are allowed to contribute a fraction of the endowment, and 
not only the whole one. This is unsubstantial for my model –I come back to this in the conclusion.  
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players . Consequently, the probability that a group of n  agents independently drawn 
from the population contains  or more principled players grows with , and thus 
cooperation gets facilitated as  increases, a result supported by experimental evidence -
see Isaac and Walker (1994). 
n
*pn n
n
The cooperative equilibrium has a natural counterpart if player’s types are private 
knowledge. In that case, one can show that principled types contribute if their prior about 
ρ  -i.e., the probability that a player is principled- is large enough. Hence, there exist a 
positive correlation between the expectations of a principled agent about aggregate 
contribution levels and her decision to contribute. Abundant experimental evidence bears 
this point –see Orbell and Dawes (1991), and Sonnemans et al. (1999).14
Experimental evidence -see Isaac and Walker (1988), and Ledyard (1995) for a 
survey- also shows that contribution levels raise if  increases. In this regard, inspection 
of equation (
m
5) points out that  depends negatively on m  only if *pn γ  and α are large 
and small enough, respectively, so that an increase in m  will foster contributions only in 
those cases. In effect, if principled agents are very aggressive –i.e., α  is high- and m  is 
large, then anger costs rise substantially when they contribute –because contributing has 
the side-effect of increasing deviators’ earnings. To find contribution optimal in that case, 
therefore, the emotional cost of defecting must be high enough. 
4.2 Competition: Market Lab Games  
Experimental evidence from a broad class of market lab games supports the 
standard prediction that prices converge to the competitive equilibrium –see, for instance, 
the survey in Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 829). Can a model of social norms explain that 
result? To study this point, consider a market game with proposer competition: 1−n  
sellers (proposers) make simultaneous price offers , , …, and  to sell one unit of 
a good to a single buyer (responder) who demands only one unit of the good. The buyer 
can accept the offer she prefers or reject all of them. 
1p 2p 1−np
Assume that the responder values one unit of the good in V monetary units. Hence, 
the responder’s monetary payoff if she accepts price offer  (ip }1,..,2,1{ −∈ ni ) is ipV − , 
whereas seller i ’s income is  -unsuccessful sellers get zero money. Finally, all players 
get no money if the responder accepts no offer. 
ip
Before applying the model of social norms to this game, it is convenient to consider 
first the standard prediction when all players are selfish. For any , the game has then 3≥n
                                                 
14 In experiments with finitely repeated public goods games, aggregate contributions fall over time, 
getting very close to the zero level. The model here suggests that such phenomenon might be due to 
learning about the number of principled players. According to this, (some) principled subjects have 
upwardly biased priors that they revise when they observe actual contribution levels. This revision 
downwards might explain the decrease in contributions.  
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a basically unique SPE: The responder always accepts the minimum price offer and at least 
two proposers offer a price equal to zero.15 The intuition why this equilibrium is unique is 
similar to that behind the Bertrand Duopoly equilibrium, and the reader is directed to a 
Microeconomics textbook for a proof. Finally, note that the standard equilibrium result is 
radically different if 2=n  because then the proposer reaps the whole surplus V  -this is 
the so-called ultimatum game; I briefly study it in section 4.4. 
What does my model predict if ? The key point here is that all allocations in 
this game are EM -the only exception are those allocations in which all players get zero, 
that is, those that follow a rejection by the responder. In effect, all allocations are efficient 
and moreover the worst pecuniary payoff is zero in all of them –if  there is always at 
least one unsuccessful seller who gets nothing. This implies that any price offer is an EM-
action and that acceptance of any offer, but not rejection, is also an EM-action. 
Consequently, the utility payoffs of any type of player coincide with monetary ones except 
if the responder deviates from the norm, that is, rejects –then she suffers a utility cost if 
she is principled whereas principled sellers anger at her. It then follows that the game has 
a basically unique SPE that coincides with the standard one previously mentioned. Clearly, 
this result does not depend on players’ types being common knowledge.  
3≥n
3≥n
Some other models of social preferences roughly predict the same result. The 
model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), for instance, predicts the standard solution if one 
assumes that the responder is restricted to accept or reject the highest price offer –note 
that this would not affect my model’s predictions. On the contrary, a responder with high 
aversion to advantageous inequity would rather accept an egalitarian sharing of the 
surplus if she was given the opportunity to choose any offer –as I assumed in my analysis.  
I finish this section on competition by briefly studying a market lab game with 
responder competition. Opposite to the game with proposer competition, this game has 
just one seller (proposer) and  buyers (responders). The proposer moves first by 
proposing a selling price 
1−n
p and then each responder decides, unaware of other responders’ 
choices, whether she accepts or reject p . All players receive a monetary payoff of zero if 
all responders reject p . In turn, the proposer gets p and the buyer if at least one 
responder accepts - a random draw selects with equal probability one of the accepting 
responders in case more than one accepts-, and all other responders receive zero.  
pV −
Note that the standard model predicts a unique SPE. In it, responders accept any 
selling price while the proposer makes a price offer of Vp = , thus reaping the whole 
surplus. Experimental evidence roughly supports this prediction –see Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999, p. 832) for references. Interestingly, my model also shares this unique prediction if 
 -the game is the ultimatum game if 3≥n 2=n , and subsection 4.4 studies it. 
                                                 
15 Many strategy profiles satisfy this, but they only differ in the distribution of offers of the remaining 
 sellers, which is inconsequential for the final result. Hence, the equilibrium outcome is unique. 3−n
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The reasons are now familiar: All Pareto-efficient allocations in this game are EM-
ones so that accepting any price offer is consistent with the EM-norm. Further, as rejection 
is never pecuniary profitable for principled or selfish responders, it follows that responders 
always accept in equilibrium, and a seller consequently asks for the whole surplus. This 
result is not affected if players’ types are private knowledge, but it is nonetheless rather 
sensitive to the specific form of function (1). In case such function included an additional 
concern for inequality like that of function (2) the predictions might be different.   
4.3 Coordination Lab Games and the Battle of the Sexes 
Norms act as focal points, and hence it is natural to ask whether they increase 
coordination. To start with a simple example, consider a lab game in which two players 
choose simultaneously between raising a red flag or a blue one. (Row player’s, Column 
player’s) monetary payoffs are represented in Figure 3, and satisfy  > b  > 0. For 
instance, each player gets  monetary units if both raise a red flag.  
a
a
  Column Player 
  Red Blue 
Red aa ,  0,0  
Row Player 
Blue 0,0  bb ,  
                             Figure 3: Monetary Payoffs in a Coordination Game. 
This is a simple coordination game. Real-life examples include deciding where and 
when we meet somebody, driving on the left/right side of a road, organizing teamwork and 
division of labor, or selecting an industry standard.16
The EM-norm clearly commends both players to raise the red flag. Hence, a 
principled player gets γ−  utils if she raises the blue flag unilaterally, 0 utils if the co-
player alone raises the blue flag, and a  or b  if both raise the red or the blue flags, 
respectively. This implies that, whatever the players’ types, there are two equilibria in pure 
strategies –i.e., {red, red} and {blue, blue}- and one in mixed strategies. Observe, 
however, that the {red, red} equilibrium EM-dominates all others.  
Therefore, and if at least one player is principled, the model unequivocally predicts 
that the players will attain the efficient outcome ( , ). On the contrary, no equilibrium 
can be refined if both players are selfish: The model is then undetermined. Nevertheless, if 
it is assumed that the players’ types are private information then it is intuitive that a 
selfish type will move red if the probability that the co-player is principled is large enough 
–more precisely, if 
a a
ba
b +>  ρ  holds, as one can easily prove.17
                                                 
16 For more examples of coordination games, consult Camerer (2003, 338-9). 
17 Observe that pre-play communication is not necessary for players to achieve coordination here. 
This suggests three conditions ensuring efficient play in a two-player game without communication: 
(a) It must be common knowledge (or highly likely) that one of the players has internalized the EM-
 16
Other models are less precise. The standard homo economicus model and any 
model of social preferences or reciprocity, for instance, do not ensure that players will 
achieve the surplus-maximizing outcome. Of course, one might solve this by applying an 
equilibrium refinement, as my model does. The question is which one. 
For instance, Harsany and Selten (1988) propose two major criteria to refine 
equilibria. One is risk-dominance, to which I will refer later, and the other one is payoff 
dominance or Pareto efficiency. An equilibrium is Pareto efficient if its associated vector of 
equilibrium utility payoffs is not Pareto dominated by any other equilibrium vector. Thus, 
equilibrium {red, red} in the game of Figure 3 is Pareto efficient, but {blue, blue} is not 
(assuming that utility coincides with money earned). The fact that {red, red} is the 
obvious solution in this game suggests that Pareto efficiency is the right refinement in this 
game. Nevertheless, refinements based on material efficiency –i.e., on the sum of 
equilibrium material payoffs- or on efficiency-cum-maximin work here as well as Pareto 
efficiency. Further, and as I will show later when analyzing other games like the Stag Hunt 
lab game, there is evidence contrary to the Pareto efficiency criterion.           
The Battle of the Sexes 
Figure 4 displays the matrix of (row player’s, column player’s) monetary payoffs in 
the ‘Battle of the Sexes’ lab game, where . Players move simultaneously. 0>> ba
 Boxing Opera 
Boxing ba  ,  0,0  
Opera 0,0  ab ,  
                   Figure 4: Monetary Payments in the Battle of the Sexes Lab Game. 
Since both and are EM-allocations, the EM-norm allows both players 
to choose any action. Hence, utility payoffs coincide with monetary payments for any type 
of player –as in the standard model! This implies in turn that, for any matching of types, 
there exist two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, that is, {Boxing, Boxing} and {Opera, 
Opera}, and one equilibrium in mixed strategies -in it, the row player chooses Boxing with 
probability 
) ,( ba ),( ab
ba
a +  , while the column player chooses Boxing with probability bab +  . Note well 
that no strategy is EM-dominated by another one. 18
Cooper et al. (1989) and Straub (1995) report experimental evidence on this lab 
game. Without pre-play communication, subjects fail to coordinate on a pure strategy 
                                                                                                                                                           
norm, (b) the norm must select a unique action profile (and for that there must be a unique EM-
allocation), and (c) it must be materially profitable to follow that profile if the co-player does as well. 
18 In an interesting variation of the game, one player moves at time t whereas the other moves at 
time t+1 without being informed of the other player’s choice. Standard theory (and my model) 
predicts here the same equilibria as in the simultaneous version. Nevertheless, a norm of ‘first come, 
first served’ might allow players to coordinate and reach the first mover’s preferred EM-allocation.  
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equilibria. Although rather erratic, behavior appears to match the mixed strategy 
equilibrium prediction as subjects choose their preferred move with the highest probability.   
The Stag Hunt Lab Game  
Figure 5 depicts (row player’s, column player’s) monetary payoffs in the Stag Hunt 
lab game, where . Play is simultaneous and not repeated. The EM-outcome 
ensues if both players choose R, but that move is ‘risky’ in that one gets zero money if the 
other player fails to play R as well. On the contrary, action S is ‘safe’ because it gives a 
sure positive payoff of . 
0>> ba
b
 R S 
R aa ,  b,0  
S 0,b  bb ,  
         Figure 5: Monetary Payoffs in the Stag Hunt Lab Game 
As the EM-norm selects action R, it follows that {R, R} is the unique refined 
equilibrium if at least one player is principled. Remaining equilibria –i.e., {S, S} and a 
mixed strategy equilibrium- are EM-dominated by {R, R}. In contrast, no equilibrium can 
be refined if both players are selfish and then there exist three equilibria: {S, S}, {R, R}, 
and a mixed strategy equilibrium in which both players choose R with probability ab . 
These results can be somehow extended to a setting where players’ types are 
private information. Intuitively, a selfish player unequivocally plays R if she believes with 
enough probability that the co-player is principled –one can prove that, interestingly, the 
corresponding threshold prior decreases as difference )( ba −  increases. Other equilibria 
exist if the prior is low so that the rate of choice of action R is then undetermined. 
In other words, efficient play is undetermined if )( ba −  sufficiently low. 
Experimental data apparently supports this indetermination. On one hand, Cooper et al. 
(1992) report results from one treatment in which each subject played the Stag Hunt lab 
game twenty times against different opponents. Payoffs ( =800; =1000) were given in 
points that determined the probability of the player winning a lottery where winning 
players received $1 and losing players received $0. Thus, the difference  was 
arguably small. The authors only give data from the last eleven periods, which show that 
play of the {S, S} equilibrium was prevalent -Clark et al. (2001) replicate these results. 
b a
)( ba −
On the other hand, Duffy and Feltovich (2002) use a payoff calibration and binary 
lottery procedure similar to those of Cooper et al. (1992), and show much larger levels of 
efficient play. They also report a large variance in the three sessions that they ran: In two 
of them, the frequency of efficient play is close to 50%, while in the other one it is 81%. 
Experimental evidence from Straub (1995) is also consistent with my prediction 
that efficient play subtly depends on )( ba− . Alternatively, that data also supports the risk 
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dominance selection criterion proposed by Harsany and Selten (1988) –indeed, Straub 
(1995) suggest that interpretation.19
4.4 Punishment  
Agent A punishes B when she imposes a cost on B without getting any immediate 
material reward as a result. According to my model, A punishes B only if B has 
transgressed a norm that A cares about and which A herself has not violated. This occurs 
because B’s deviation triggers an aggressive emotion in A that goes associated with an 
impulse to retaliate. 
To illustrate this with an example, consider the lab game tree at Figure 6, where 
only monetary payoffs are depicted. The first mover can offer either (player 1’s, player 2’s) 
allocation (8, 2) or (5, 5), and then the second mover can accept (A) or reject (R) the 
offer. In case she rejects it, both players get zero money. Otherwise, the offer is 
implemented. This lab game is a simplified version of an Ultimatum Game with stakes 
equal to 10 monetary units –the difference is that the range of offers in the ultimatum 
game consists of all possible divisions of the stakes. I stick to this simple version because 
it is sufficient to show how punishment works -for a detailed analysis of the model’s 
predictions in the Ultimatum lab game, consult López-Pérez, 2004. 
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                                         Figure 6: A Mini-Ultimatum Lab Game  
As (5, 5) is the unique EM-allocation of this game, the EM-norm clearly commends 
player 1 to offer (5, 5) and player 2 to accept it. On the other hand, if player 1 deviates 
from the norm and offers (8, 2), the EM-norm allows player 2 to choose any move. Arrows 
in Figure 6 indicate that the associated action is selected by the EM-norm. 
The game has essentially a unique SPE. In it, a selfish second mover accepts any 
offer. Further, a principled second mover accepts offer (5, 5), rejects (8, 2) if α⋅−> 820  
and accepts it if α⋅−< 820 . In the marginal case 25.0=α , a principled second mover is 
indifferent between accepting or rejecting (8, 2) and there are two SPE then. 
                                                 
19 An equilibrium is risk dominant if it maximizes the product of the gains from unilateral deviation. If 
both Stag Hunt players are selfish and , equilibrium {S, S} is the only risk-dominant one 
because . 
ab >2
)()()0()0( bababb −⋅−>−⋅−
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In turn, the first mover’s offer depends on both players’ types, as Figure 7 
indicates. The first column in this matrix shows player 1’s type, while the first row shows 
player 2’s type. For instance, player 1 abides by the EM-norm and offers (5, 5) 
independently of the co-player’s type if she is principled and 3≥γ .20     
                   Player 2’s type is… 
Player 1’s type is…   
… selfish or principled  
with 25.0<α . 
… principled  
with 25.0>α . 
… selfish or principled with 3<γ . (8, 2) (5, 5) 
… principled and 3≥γ . (5, 5) (5, 5) 
              Figure 7: Player 1’s SPE offer depending on her type and the second mover’s. 
Note that this result can be easily extended to an incomplete information setting. 
The only caveat in that case is that a selfish first mover or a principled one with 3<γ  
would condition her choice on her prior about the second mover’s type -the reader may 
easily compute the minimal prior that makes an offer of (8, 2) optimal.  
Experimental data from ultimatum games –see Camerer (2003, pp. 48-55) for an 
informative survey- confirms that the 50-50 offer is almost always accepted, whereas low 
offers face a high probability of rejection. Studies also show that “very large changes in 
stakes have only a modest effect on rejections”,21 something that is barely consistent with 
my model –if a principled second mover rejects (8, 2) in the lab game of Figure 6 then she 
also rejects offer (8·k, 2·k) when stakes are k>0 times bigger. 
The model shows that punishment depends on parameter α  -which, incidentally, 
could be estimated from experimental data. In fact, if one assumed that principled players 
are heterogeneous regarding their aggressiveness –i.e., parameter α -, a law of demand 
would follow: The more costly punishment is the less of it there is. To see this, consider a 
slightly modified version of the lab game at Figure 6 in which allocation (6, 4) replaces 
allocation (8, 2). Since (5, 5) is still the only EM-allocation, a principled second mover will 
anger if she is offered (6, 4). Nevertheless, punishing (i.e., rejecting) such offer is more 
costly than rejecting offer (8, 2) and hence only optimal if α  is relatively large –more 
precisely, if 32>α  holds. To sum up, principled agents use relatively costly punishment 
technologies only if they are aggressive enough. 
Another interesting issue concerns responsibility (or ‘intentions’, to use a usual 
terminology). Experimental evidence indicates that responsibility is crucial to understand 
who is punished (Blount 1995), and the model is consistent with this because it predicts 
that only wrongdoers get punished. To understand some implications of this, assume that 
player 1 has no say in the lab game of Figure 6 and that his move is decided by a random 
                                                 
20 There are two SPE if 3=γ  and the second mover accepts (8, 2). However, the equilibrium in 
which player 1 offers (8, 2) is EM-dominated and can thus be ruled out. 
21 Camerer (2003, pp. 61). 
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device –thus, player 1 is not to be blamed for anything that happens in the game. As the 
EM-norm does not restrict non-human choices, a principled second mover will not anger at 
any offer and hence will not reject it. Therefore, and in comparison with the intentional 
treatment, the model predicts a smaller rate of rejection in the random treatment, 
someth
. This is highly consistent with the experimental 
eviden
del has been 
n to b
(1)  simultaneous PD lab game, or 
(2) movers’ 
 simultaneous PD. 
(4) indly both dummies and kind active players 
(5) payments in order to increase efficiency 
(6) ends on the whole menu of alternatives, not only on the 
(7) 
                                                
ing that is consistent with the results reported by Blount (1995). 
The word ‘intentions’ also refers sometimes to the influence of non-chosen 
alternatives. To illustrate this point, consider a slight variation of the lab game of Figure 6, 
in which allocation (10, 0) replaces allocation (5, 5). Compare now the rejection rate of 
offer (8, 2) in this new game and in the former game. Does the model predict a difference? 
The answer is yes. As offer (8, 2) constitutes a deviation from the EM-norm when the 
alternative is (5, 5), but not when the alternative is (10, 0), the model of social norms 
clearly predicts a larger rejection rate in the former case –in fact, the model predicts that 
nobody rejects (8, 2) if the alternative is (10, 0). In general, as a norm may select 
different actions depending on the available alternatives, an act may constitute 
misbehavior and hence be punished in one game but not in another, even if it has the 
same material consequences in both cases
ce –see Camerer (2003, p. 81-82). 
5. Comparison with Other Utility Models 
It can be illustrative to compare the behavioral predictions of my model with those 
from other models.22 With regard first to cooperation and punishment, the mo
show e consistent with seven well-replicated experimental phenomena:  
A significant proportion of people cooperate in a
contribute in a one-shot public good lab game. 
Subjects also contribute in a sequential PD, and the rate of first 
cooperation is larger than average cooperation in the
(3) Subjects give money to passive players (dummies). 
Subjects tend to treat equally k
(absence of positive reciprocity). 
Many subjects sacrifice equality of 
and/or the worst-off player’s payoff. 
Punishment dep
available ones. 
Subjects do not punish dummies (responsibility).    
Figure 8 indicates whether other utility theories are consistent with facts (1) to (7). 
Entry YES indicates that the corresponding theory is consistent with the fact, whereas 
entry NO indicates the opposite. For brevity, I consider just four models, each one 
representing a different research line in the existing literature. Models of inequity aversion 
 
22 Consult López-Pérez (2004) for a more lengthy discussion that includes the analysis of other 
games like Ultimatum, Dictator, Trust, Best-Shot, and Cournot duopoly games. 
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like Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) represent pure 
consequentialistic models in which people only have distributional concerns –other 
examples include the model of quasi-maximin preferences of Charness and Rabin (2002). 
Rabin (1993) is a pure reciprocity model with no distributional concerns, as Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger (2004). These two models are based on the Psychological Game Theory of 
Geanakoplos et al. (1989), as Falk and Fischbacher (2006). However, the latter introduces 
both reciprocal and distributional concerns. Finally, Levine (1998) is a model of type-based 
reciprocity.    
             Facts 
Theories 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Rabin (1993) YES NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Levine (1998) YES YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Inequity aversion YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 
F&F (2006) NO YES YES NO NO YES NO 
          
nly applied to two-player, 
normal
odel, 
and he  the efficient outcome. 
                                                
                      Figure 8: Predictions by Other Utility Models  
  The interested reader is directed to the relevant papers for a detailed explanation 
of these predictions. However, I would like to remark that both mutual cooperation and 
defection constitute equilibria in the simultaneous PD (or in a one-shot public good game) 
if both players are sufficiently averse to advantageous inequality. This implies that models 
of inequity aversion are undetermined with regard to the cooperation level in the PD 
game.23 The same occurs with Rabin (1993), which can be o
 form games, and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). 
Most models can explain the experimental results from market lab games. With 
regard to the battle of the sexes, predictions by inequity aversion models or Falk and 
Fischbacher (2006) are highly dependent on the value of the parameters. For instance, 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) predict equilibria {Boxing, Opera} and {Opera, Boxing} if both 
players are very inequity averse. Rabin (1993), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) 
share those predictions if both players have a “strong enough emotional reaction to each 
other’s behavior” (Rabin, 1993, p. 1285). In this regard, it might be interesting to 
investigate a sequential version of the game to test these theories, which predict that 
some second movers will intentionally mismatch. Finally, models of inequity aversion 
predict in the Stag Hunt game the same pure strategy equilibria as the standard m
nce zero is the lowest possible level of coordination on
6. Conclusion and Extensions 
 
23 If one assumes, as Fehr and Schmidt (1999, page 842) suggest, that efficiency and symmetry act 
as a focal point then the cooperative equilibrium is focal, and the predictions by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) for this game would be similar to mine. However, this focal point is not consistent with other 
lab evidence, as the analysis of the Stag Hunt game previously showed.  
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This paper offers a model of social norms and shows that a large set of 
experimental evidence can be explained if one assumes that (some) people care about a 
particular norm of distributive justice. The model explains not only why people cooperate 
in some cases and compete in others, or how punishment work, but also why norms may 
sometimes enhance coordination on efficient outcomes. The model appears to be 
empiric
it affects communication. This is an 
interes
iew of what is correct: 
‘Small’
t the marginal utility of money is decreasing would 
explain
ight be used to study how norms and 
emotio  affect bargaining, collusion between firms, conflict, charity giving, revolutions, 
team behavior, and voting, to give some examples.  
                                                
ally more relevant than other models of non-selfish preferences. Moreover, it is 
much simpler and precise than other models of reciprocity. 
There are some possible ways to extend the model. A natural one is considering 
other norms that the EM-norm. For instance, one could assume that some people have 
internalized a norm of honesty, and study how 
ting issue and it seems that the model here has a comparative advantage when 
compared with other models of social preferences. 
One could also think of more realistic norms of distributive justice. The EM-norm is 
too strict in that it allows any behavior after one deviation occurs. Less draconian norms 
would select in that case only those actions leading towards an allocation that maximizes 
the material welfare of those who have hitherto respected the norm - López-Pérez (2005) 
gives particular examples. Further, the EM-norm is probably too austere in that it focuses 
on EM-actions. However, people seem to have a more flexible v
 deviations from the ideal moral behavior –e.g. the EM-path in this model- are 
usually considered valid as well, and they do not trigger anger.   
Some of the motivational hypothesis of the model could be also relaxed. For 
instance, the model assumes that bad feelings do not depend on the specific deviation one 
makes from an internalized norm. But it seems realistic to assume that remorse is higher 
depending on the material consequences of the deviation24 –e.g., cheating in a medical 
article should generate more remorse than cheating in an economics paper! This 
hypothesis and an additional one tha
, for instance, why participants in public good games often contribute something 
between zero and their endowment.  
As a final remark, the model here should motivate further experimental research on 
social norms, emotions, and reciprocity. Further, it m
ns
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 I have investigated this point in López-Pérez (2005). 
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